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ABSTRACT
The relationship between the President and the Senate of the United
States with respect to the treaty-making power is examined in the light of
the formulation and ratification of the Constitution and subsequent his-
torical events and expert opinion. It is concluded that the President
must seek the advice of the Senate both before entering into substantive
treaty negotiations and also during their course, and the consent of the
Senate when specific agreements are to be pursued. If the Senate should
agree that the major treaty provisions to be offered for negotiation cannot
be determined before negotiations are to begin, then the President should
appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a special envoy
whose specific task is to form a treaty for later submission. The implica-
tions of this conclusion for improving the chances of success of the present
Vietnam peace treaty negotiations are discussed.
He [the Presidentj shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres-
ent concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, . . . whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, . ..
1
The Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.2
This Constitution ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land...3
INTRODUCTION
Does the President have the constitutional power to negotiate a peace
treaty with North and South Vietnam without the formal advice and
consent of the Senate as a body? The Author's contention is that the
President does not. Were the President to seek this advice and consent,
it would help him greatly in quickly negotiating a workable treaty, which
is so desperately needed. Without this advice and consent, the President
* The author is currently engaged in graduate research at The Ohio State University re-
lating to nuclear safety studies of advanced reactor concepts for electric power production. He
holds a B.S. degree in Engineering Physics from The University of Toledo.
I U.S. CoNsT. article II, § 7.
2 U.S. CoNST. amend. X.
3 U.S .CoNsT. article VI.
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is representing only himself and his administration, and hence is oper-
ating in a political vacuum. In 1788 in the Federalist Papers, which
were written to promote the adoption of our Constitution, John Jay stated
that the "president and senators so chosen will always be of the number
of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered
in relation to the several states or to foreign nations. With such men
the power of making treaties may be safely lodged."4  With the advice
and consent of the Senate, the President would represent more accurately
the position and interests of the United States at the Paris negotiations.
North Vietnam and the NLF would then be aware that the President's
negotiating polices represent more than just the interests and atti-
tudes of a particular administration and therefore would be less inclined
to expect that a contrary public opinion in the United States could pro-
duce a change in policy in time. In forming the "advice" each Senator
would be required to review this matter in its entirety and to act on a
considered personal opinion. Such an undertaking would help crystallize
exactly what is the national interest. Indeed, the Senate could take the
initiative and begin to form the advice, starting from known presidential
opinions.
The considerations that militate against this view are twofold: (1) a
tradition of allowing the President to form treaties on his own authority
without the formal advice and consent of the Senate; and (2) the ex-
planation of the treaty-making power given in Senate Document No. 39,
Constitution of the United States-Analysis and Interpretation, dated
1964, which attempts to justify the current practice. The latter tends to
perpetuate the current practice since it purports to define the Constitu-
tion's treaty power provision. Since the Senators and the President
swore to support the Constitution, none would challenge current practice
if it were thought to be constitutional. The editors of Senate Doc. No.
39 are E. S. Corwin and others; they prepared the document for the Library
of Congress Legislative Reference Service. Corwin also wrote the influ-
ential book, The President-Office and Powers. Although Mr. Corwin
has made an important contribution to some aspects of constitutional
law, his opinion in this connection cannot be taken as the final word.
After reviewing Corwin's opinion and his justification (given in
Sen. Doc. No. 39 and in his book), along with other documents and writ-
ings and Supreme Court cases, the Author has concluded that the Presi-
dent must not only have the formal advice and consent of the Senate be-
fore negotiating matters of substance (the President may, however, initi-
ate talks on his own authority), but that it would be in the best interest
of the nation for the President to obtain that advice and consent. The
remainder of this article, then, contains a review of the principal circum-
4 THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay).
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stances surrounding the "advice and consent" phrase in the treaty power.
The statements and references given by Corwin which are pertinent to the
subject are used as a guide and each of these is treated herein.
We begin with an analysis of Senate Doc. No. 39. Here Corwin as
justification for the current practice uses only four facts: (1) part of an
essay by John Jay in the Federalist Papers; (2) part of a Senate speech
by Rufus King in 1818; (3) the experience of President Washington in
seeking Senate advice in making treaties; and (4) the opinion of Justice
Sutherland in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.5 This article will attempt to
show that Corwin did not use the first three of these items in context,
and that the inferences which can properly be drawn from these sources
do not support the position adopted either in Senate Doc. No. 39 or in
Corwin's book.
The President-Senate relationships during the formation of the Jay
Treaty and the Versailles Treaty are discussed. A separate and detailed
analysis of Justice Sutherland's opinion on the treaty-making power in the
Curtiss-Wright decision is also included. More evidence is also provided
regarding (1) the question of whether Senate advice requires Senate
action as a body, (2) the origin of the treaty clause phraseology, and (3)
the President's role as Commander in Chief in making peace treaties.
Finally, the Vietnam peace treaty negotiations are discussed.
E. S. CORWIN AND SENATE DOCUMENT No. 39
1. John Jay and the Federalist Papers
In order to better understand the analysis of Senate Doc. No. 39, the
reader is invited to read the entire paragraph entitled "President and
Senate" in that document.' It would seem that this paragraph lends sup-
port to the Author's contention by stating that "The constitutional clause
evidently assumes that the President and the Senate will be associated
with the entire process of making a treaty."'  The paragraph, however,
5299 U.S. 304 (1936).
6 S. Doc- No. 39,88th CONG., 2d SEss. (1964), p. 462:
"The plan which the Committee of Detail reported to the Federal Convention on August
6, 1787 provided that "the Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and
to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court." Not until September 7, ten
days before the Convention's final adjournment, was the President made a participant in
these powers. The constitution's clause evidently assumes that the President and the Sen-
ate will be associated throughout the entire process of making a treaty, although Jay, writing
in the Federalist, foresaw that the initiative must often be seized by the President without
benefit of Senatorial counsel. Yet so late as 1818 Rufus King, Senator from New York, who
had been a member of the Convention, declared on the floor of the Senate: "In these concerns the
Senate are the Constitutional and only responsible counsellors of the President. And in
this capacity the Senate may, and ought to, look into and watch over every branch of the for-
eign affairs of the nation; they may, therefore, at any time call for full and exact informa-
tion respecting the foreign affairs, and express their opinion and advice to the President respect-
ing the same, when, and under whatever other circumstances, they may think such advice
expedient."
7Id.
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then states that "John Jay, writing in the Federalist, foresaw that the
initiative must often be seized by the President without benefit of Sena-
torial counsel." This brief report of Jay's essay could be readily mis-
construed. One might suppose that Jay did not adopt in his essay the
above view about "the entire process of making a treaty," and one
might understand the "initiative" remark as attributing more power to
the President than Jay in context actually did. The full Jay essay" said of
treaties that "The President must, in forming them, act by the advice
and consent of the Senate" and that the initiative relates to "those pre-
paratory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a
national view .. .and which usually require the most secrecy and the
most dispatch."'1  The Jay essay does not add confusion to the treaty
clause in the Constitution, as Corwin implies; but rather this essay ex-
plains the clause. It must be remembered that the Federalist Papers were
written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in order
to explain the Constitution to the people and secure its adoption by the
separate States.
2. Rufus King's 1818 Speech
Senate Doc. No. 39 points out that the Senate may advise the Presi-
dent, without his asking, basing this conclusion on a Senate speech given
by Rufus King in 1818. No one would deny this power to the Senate.
However, the significance of this speech lies not in whether the Senate
may volunteer advice; it lies in the last two paragraphs of that speech
(not discussed in Senate Doc. No. 39) where the phrase "make a treaty"
is defined and explained. Rufus King stated: 'The Constitution does
not say that treaties shall be concluded but that they shall be made by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate." He asserted that "to
make a treaty includes all the proceedings by which it is made."" King
said that any other interpretation would require that the Constitution be
changed to read: "The President shall make treaties, and by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate ratify the same."'" King's speech is
consistent with the above mentioned Jay essay: Jay did not say that the
President must, in concluding treaties, act by the advice and consent of
the Senate, but that he "must, in forming them, act by and with ... " (em-
phasis added).
Rufus King was a delegate from Massachusetts to the Federal Con-
vention, which drafted the Constitution, and played a prominent role
8 THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (JI. Jay).
9 ld.
10 Id.
11ANNALS OF CONG. 15 CONG. 1st SESS., I, at 106-07. See also 3 M. FA-uAND, TnE
REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 424 (Yale Univ. Press).
12 Id.
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there. 3 He was on the Committee of Style along with Hamilton and
Madison and was on the Committee of Eleven which drafted the treaty
clause. He actively promoted the new Constitution and was elected as a
delegate to the Massachusetts Convention which ratified it. Later as a
U.S. Senator, he was a member of the Committees on Finance and For-
eign Relations, and served as chairman of the latter.14 The speech cited
is the only explicit definition of the treaty power offered in The Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787 which were collected and edited by
M. Farrand (Farrand included the King speech in the appendix as "sup-
plementary material that could be found" to throw "light upon the work
of the constitutional convention.").
The background of Rufus King's speech is most helpful in perceiving
its full meaning.'5 The Society of Friends of Baltimore in late 1817
brought a petition to the Senate on the subject of abolishing slave trade.
Senator Burrill, in support of this petition, proposed a Senate resolution
to direct the Committee on Foreign Relations to inquire into the "ex-
pediency of taking measures in concert with other nations for the en-
tire abolition of the said trade." In the ensuing Senate debate on the
resolution Senator King, in support of the resolution, noted that our
"long depending negotiations [on the subject of slave traded with Spain
still exists." He urged that our foreign ministers be reminded that the
United States is greatly interested in abolishing slave trade universally
and should therefore press for an agreement with the foreign powers."6
After King's remarks an objection was raised to advising the President
in the forming of a treaty with Spain. This objection was based on the
supposition that the business of making this treaty belonged exclusively
to the Executive. King replies with his explanation of the treaty power.
The Burrill resolution was passed without modification, which indicates
that the Senate concurred in King's explanation of the treaty power.
The only clue as to why Senate Doc. No. 39 does not discuss the last
part of King's speech, which defines the phrase "make a treaty," is pro-
vided in a footnote in Corwin's book, President-Office and Powers.7
In this footnote Corwin implies that the King speech is nullified by a
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report issued two years earlier
(February 15, 1816)."8 The committee report had to do with a Senate
resolution proposed by Rufus King which would advise the President
concerning his negotiations with Great Britain on certain matters of com-
Is M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (Yale University Press).
14 R. ERNST, RUFUS KING-AMMICAN FEDERALIST (University of North Carolina Press).
15 6 C. R_ KING, THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 90-95.
IG Id.
17 E. S. CORWiN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS 478 (N.Y.U. Press, 1948).
18 8 S. Doc. No. 231, 56th CONG. 2d SEss. Compilation of Reports of Committee op Foreign
Relations, 1789-1901, p. 22-24.
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merce. The committee rejected the proposal on the ground that such ad-
vice was unnecessary, because the committee felt that the President
had already pursued the ideas contained in King's resolution, and further
that it was not in the national interest for the Senate to interfere since
a division of opinion between the Senate and the Executive would give
the other side a decided advantage. However, the report of the com-
mittee contains no treatment of the question of constitutional power, ex-
cept the observation that the Constitution permits only the President to
conduct foreign negotiations, which is of course true. The report stands
for no proposition except that the committee felt it would be unwise to
interfere in those particular negotiations. To treat this report as a con-
stitutional ruling on the making of treaties is unwarranted. The fact
that two years later King won in his contention that the Senate could of-
fer unsolicited advice to the President (i.e., the Burrill resolution),
after he argued on constitutional grounds, makes it dear that the earlier
committee report could not in any case be taken to represent Senate
opinion on the treaty power.
3. George lashington's First Attempt at Treaty-Making
Perhaps the main reasons for the current practice are the prevailing
views, in the executive branch at least, that (1) seeking advice from the
Senate prior to substantive negotiations is impractical and (2) the Con-
stitution is not clear as to how advice and consent are to be rendered.
In search of the true meaning of the treaty clause one would certainly
want to learn how President Washington carried out this power since
he was the first President under the Constitution. In his book on the
presidency Corwin tells the reader that Washington tried to use the Sen-
ate as a council in forming treaties but that this simply did not work:
"The somber truth is that the conception of the Senate as a presidential
council in the diplomatic field broke down the first time it was put to the
test."'1  In a footnote in Sen. Doc. No. 39 Corwin states that Washing-
ton's efforts to obtain advice and consent "proved futile, principally be-
cause the Senate balked."2" In another book The President's Control of
Foreign Relations (1917), Corwin says: "at the outset, Washington
sought to associate the Senate with himself in the negotiation of treaties
but this method of proceeding went badly and was presently aban-
doned.""'
These statements are simply not true. The incident to which Corwin
refers is the formation of the first treaty under the Constitution.22 Presi-
1) E. S. CORwiN, supra note 17, at 254-58.
20 S. Doc. No. 39,88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), P-463.
21 E. S. CORWiN, THE PREsmENT's CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917), p. 85.
22 Annals of Congress, August 22-2 6, 1789.
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dent Washington (who was also president of the Federal Convention
and among those who best understood the Constitution) appeared before
the Senate and asked for its "advice and consent to some propositions
respecting the treaty to be held with the Southern Indians." (emphasis
added) The Senate, in deliberating the matter, was concerned about
Washington's insistence on being present while the Senate debated.
They felt that Washington's personal authority prevented freedom of
discussion and refused to give advice and consent on that day and wanted
to postpone a decision until the next week. Washington became angry
over the delay but then agreed to comply. Three days later the Senate
gave its advice and consent to Washington's proposals without difficulty.
The fact is that Washington consulted the Senate in advance of the
making of every treaty in his administration 3 and obtained the advice and
consent of the Senate. After the first experience, which Corwin has mis-
represented, he did so through messages and not in person. The only
"method of proceeding" that was "abandoned" was personal consultation
as distinguished from written communication.
The remaining piece of evidence which Corwin used in The Presi-
dent's Control of Foreign Relations was taken from John Q. Adams'
"Memoirs":
Mr. Crawford told twice over the story of President Washington's hav-
ing at an early period of his administration gone to the Senate with a
project of a treaty to be negotiated, and been present at their deliberations
upon it. They debated it and proposed alterations so that when Washing-
ton left the Senate Chamber he said he would be d----d if he ever went
there again. And ever since that time treaties have been negotiated by the
Executive before submitting them to the consideration of the Senate.24
Corwin has made this story quite popular and it is generally accepted with-
out question.25  Because of this and because by itself it seems to run
counter to the above findings, this passage must be reviewed in detail.
From this minuscule item of evidence Corwin draws the conclusion that
after his first attempt Washington did not seek Senate advice before treaty
negotiations. (On the contrary, he did as is later shown.) After citing
this quotation, Corwin says that Adams was stating a rule of procedure
which did not require the President to seek advice of the Senate beforet
'negotiating a particular treaty." But Corwin's conclusion was simply
a case of reading something into Adams which is not stated there. The
background of the Adams' writing is as follows. 26
2 3 R. HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES-1789-1817 (MacMillan).
24 F. S. CoRwIN, supra note 22, at 87-88.
25 H. F. GRAFF, "Thinking Aloud: Participatory Foreign Policy," The New Leader Maga-
zine, March 2, 1970. See also CONG. PEc S4132, March 20, 1970, and E. F. GOLDMAN,
"The President, The People, and The Power to Make War," American Heritage Magazine,
April, 1970.26J. Q. ADAMs, MEMOiRS, Vol. 6, 310-430 [hereinafter cited as MEMoms].
[Vol. 31
TREATY MAKING POWER
The Ghent Treaty of 1815 between the United States and Great Brit-
ain stipulated "that both parties should use their best endeavors to ac-
complish the abolition of the African slave trade." 7 Recall that in 1818
the Senate passed a resolution advising the President to press harder for
an international agreement to abolish the African slave trade. Two
years later, while our negotiations with Great Britain were going on,
the United States enacted a law on May 15, 1820, making it unlawful for
a U. S. citizen to engage in the African slave trade. On February 28,
1823, the House of Representatives passed a resolution "that the Presi-
dent of the United States be requested to enter upon and prosecute,
from time to time, such negotiations with the several maritime powers of
Europe and America, as he may deem expedient, for the effected aboli-
tion of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation as piracy
under the law of nations, by the consent of the civilized world."2 It
can therefore be said that the President pursued the negotiations by and
with the advice of the Senate, and indeed of both houses of the Congress.
The episode in no way supports the "rule" that Corwin inferred from
the account by Adams. We should inquire into the context of the Craw-
ford comment to determine the problem toward which it was directed.
On April 30, 1824 as a result of these negotiations President Monroe
submitted to the Senate a Slave Trade Convention with Britain that rec-
ognized slave trading as an act of piracy. However, some of the Senators
from the Southern States were becoming uneasy over the growing senti-
ment in Great Britain in favor of abolishing slavery altogether and
thought that to ratify the Convention would produce the same effect
in the United States. For this and other reasons there was new opposi-
tion to the treaty in the Senate. When President Monroe learned from
Adams of this opposition, which brought about some delay in the ratifica-
tion of the treaty, he was "astonished." Then, upon learning that the
treaty might be defeated, Monroe quickly sent a message (drafted by
Adams) to the Senate pleading for ratification. The message was de-
tailed and presented persuasive arguments. 9 On the next day the Senate
ratified the convention with amendments. Rufus King, who was instru-
mental in bringing the Senate to advise the President to make a slave
trade treaty in 1818, reported the Senate action personally to Secretary of
State Adams. King apologized for the amendments but Adams replied
that the amendments, although significant, were not serious: "The essen-
tial basis of the Convention was untouched," i.e., the principals "slave
trade shall be piracy" and "the mutual right of search and capture" were
preserved. But Britain did not ratify the amended treaty. Five months
27 SN. ExEc. JouRNAL Vol. 3, at 381.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 380-85.
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later an envoy from Britain proposed to conclude a new convention to
provide for right of search on the coast of America, a provision which
had been rejected previously by the Senate. The new convention was to
be otherwise the same as the draft previously ratified by the Senate.
President Monroe held a cabinet meeting on November 10, 1824 to dis-
cuss the British proposal. In the meeting it was agreed not to conclude
a new convention since the mood in the Senate against it was even
stronger than before. It was in this meeting that Crawford made the
comment that was used by Corwin.
President Monroe may have wanted to consult personally with the
Senate to try to persuade them to accept the new convention. After all,
Monroe had before rescued the treaty from defeat by consulting the
Senate by means of a detailed message. This would explain why Craw-
ford, in the cabinet meeting, told the story of George Washington's ex-
perience with personal consultation with the Senate. But Corwin's in-
ference from Crawford's statement that the President need not consult
the Senate prior to entering into substantive negotiations is unfounded.
Furthermore, Adams had this to say about any further negotiations on
the subject of the slave trade:
I had observed to Mercer that after what had taken place in the Senate
upon this Convention, and the subsequent effort, obviously intended to
follow it up, to make it unpopular, the power of the President to negoti-
ate further under the resolution of the House would be much checked
until there should be some further manifestation of opinion by Congress
in its favor.30
Finally, on January 20, 1825 Monroe in a message to the Senate indi-
cated that negotiations would be resumed only by "common consent."3 1
CORWIN AND THE JAY TREATY
In his book President-Office and Powers Corwin implies that the
Jay Treaty (the first foreign treaty under the Constitution) was negoti-
ated without the advice and consent of the Senate. Corwin states:
From that time forth [meaning: from the time Washington personally
appeared in the Senate chamberl in fact, the relations of President and
Senate in the realm of diplomacy came rapidly to assume a dose approach
to their present form. The history of the famous Jay Treaty five years
later is a prime illustration. The treaty was negotiated in London under
instructions in the framing of which the Senate had no hand. 32
The implication given is that Washington did not seek the advice and
consent to negotiate. On the contrary, he did.
30 MEmo IS at 361.
3 SEN. ExEc. JouRNAL Vol. 3, at 410.
3 2 E. S. CoRwIN, supra note 17 at 254-58.
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The events surrounding the Jay Treaty are as follows.33 During the
first years under the Constitution there still remained some differences be-
tween Great Britain and the United States. On February 9, 1790, Wash-
ington asked the Senate's advice as to the best method of settling a number
of these old disputes:
You will perceive, from the papers herewith delivered, and which are
enumerated in the annexed list, that a difference subsists between Great
Britain and the United States, relative to the boundary line between our
Eastern and their territories. A plan for deciding this difference was laid
before the late Congress; and whether that, or some other plan of a like
kind, would not now be eligible, is submitted to your consideration.
In my opinion, it is desirable that all questions between this and other
nation be speedily and amicably settled; and in this instance I think it ad-
visable to postpone any negotiations on the subject, until I shall be in-
formed of the result of your deliberations, and receive your advice as to the
propositions most proper to be offered on the part of the United States.
As I am taking measures for learning the intentions of Great Britain
respecting the further detention of our posts, &c. I am the more solicitous
that the business, now submitted to you, may be prepared for negotiation,
as soon as the other important affairs which engage your attention will
permit.34
On March 24, 1790 the Senate advised the President and suggested a
plan. Washington then sent a representative to England who infor-
mally sampled opinions of some British leaders and concluded that the
plan was not acceptable. Thereupon, Washington reported back to the
Senate on February 14, 1791. As time went by, the disputes grew more
serious as England seized some American ships and incited Indians against
our settlers. Resolutions were before the House of Representatives "for
cutting off commercial intercourse and sequestering British Debts."
Knowing that the resolutions before the House were moving the country
back into war, a group of Senators, which included Rufus King, held a
conference and quickly developed the Jay envoyship plan and gave it to
Washington. 5  That plan was to have the United States send to England
a person who would have the highest confidence of the British leaders to
find out their concerns and the reasons for their hostile acts and to negoti-
ate a settlement. Our ambassador in Great Britain at the time would
not do. Our negotiator had to be of high standing and enjoy the high-
est confidence of the American people. He would make the voyage
across the Atlantic to impress the British of our sincere desire to make a
friendly settlement of differences. The person chosen by Washington,
with the help of the small group of Senators, was John Jay, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. Then, in accordance with the requirement
3 3 R. HAYDEN, supra note 23. See also SEN. ExEc. JOURNAL Vol. 1.
34 SEN. EXEC. JOURNAL Vol. 1, at 37.
35 1 C. R. KING, THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 517.
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of the Constitution, Washington sought the Senate's advice and con-
sent to appoint Jay as "Envoy Extraordinary of the United States, to his
Britannic Majesty" for the purpose of negotiating a treaty whose proposi-
tions, because of the nature of things, could not be known beforehand.
The message from George Washington to the Senate was as follows:
Gentlemen of the Senate: The communications which I have made
to you during your present session, from the dispatches of our Minister
in London, contain a serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain.
But as peace ought to be pursued with unremitted zeal, before the last
resource, which has so often been the scourge of nations, and cannot fail
to check the advanced prosperity of the United States, is contemplated; I
have thought proper to nominate, and do hereby nominate, John Jay, as
Envoy Extraordinary of the United States, to his Britannic Majesty.
My confidence in our Minister Plenipotentiary at London, continues
undiminished. But a mission like this, while it corresponds with the
solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world the solicitude for a
friendly adjustment of our complaints, and a reluctance to hostility. Go-
ing immediately from the United States, such an Envoy will carry with
him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibilities of our
country, and will thus be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness,
and to cultivate peace with sincerity.36
The Senate approved the nomination three days later, after some de-
bate, with the full knowledge and understanding that for these particu-
lar negotiations, the treaty propositions could not be known a priori.
Thus the Senate in consenting to the mission shared the confidence Wash-
ington had in John Jay that whatever Jay would agree to would be in
the interest of the United States. 7 (In contrast, the Senate had not been
asked its advice and consent in appointing the envoys to Paris to negoti-
ate a treaty with North Vietnam.) It is the Author's contention that
President Washington had fully met the requirements of the Constitution
in this instance since the Senate's advice and consent was sought and
obtained before negotiations. The Senate simply chose not to require
that Jay be given instructions and was willing to wait until Jay brought
back a treaty which would serve as a basis for consultation with the Sen-
ate. Eleven months later Jay returned with a settlement. It was laid
before the Senate for its advice and consent. The Senate in turn ap-
proved it, subject to an amendment. The amendment was easily negoti-
ated with Britain and the treaty went into effect. A war had thus been
avoided. And so it was that the Senate did perform a large role in mak-
ing the treaty, not only by advising and consenting to the Jay appoint-
ment but by participating in the earlier events of 1790-91 mentioned
above. The earlier attempts at settling the disputes, which were based on
36 SEN. Bxc. JouRNAL Vol. 1, at 150; incidentally, the phrasing of Washington's mes-
sage had its origin in the minutes of the above mentioned conference of Senators. See id.
3 7 R. HAYDEN, supra note 23.
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Senate advice, made both the President and the Senate that much wiser
when the disputes erupted. For they then knew that a much stronger
diplomatic move was necessary to avert the fast-approaching war.
The conclusion drawn from the history of the Jay Treaty by Corwin,
and probably by others as well, is that since the Senate consented to let
the executive branch alone frame a treaty during foreign negotiation, any
President in the future could enter into negotiations and continue on
through to a finished treaty without the Senate's consent to do so for
each occasion.3 8 Corwin states, "In a word, the Senate's character as an
executive council was from the beginning put, and largely by its own
election, on the way to absorption into its more usual character as a leg-
islative chamber." This conclusion again shows up in Sen. Doc. No.
39 under the paragraph entitled "Negotiations, A Presidential Monop-
oly." 9  But this conclusion is without foundation. No evidence exists
that in consenting to the Jay nomination the Senate intended to author-
ize all future Presidents to enter into substantive negotiations without
the advice and consent of the Senate. Moreover, the Senate does not
have the authority to transfer this power to the President and the Presi-
dent does not have the authority to assume it. Therefore, if anyone
were to claim that a precedent was established by the Jay Treaty events,
that precedent, which is in accordance with the Constitution, would be as
follows: If the terms on which a settlement is possible cannot be esti-
mated beforehand, then the President should nominate a person for the
specific task of meeting with the other side and framing a basis for a
settlement. But before the envoy can be appointed, the Senate's advice
and consent is needed. The treaty provisions arranged by the envoy
would then be used by the President as a basis on which to approach the
Senate for its advice and consent on concluding the treaty.
Fleming sums it up as follows. After his first treaty,
Washington confined his communication with the Senate on the sub-
ject of treaties to written messages, though he still adhered to the practice
of asking the advice of the Senate before negotiations were opened and
during their course. Negotiations with England over the northeastern
boundary were suspended until the President could consult the Senate,
and the Senate agreed in advance to approve the proposed terms of a
treaty with Algiers. Even this method of consulting the Senate during
negotiations lapsed with Washington, however, and seems not to have
been resumed until 1838, when President Van Buren asked the Senate
to disapprove a proposed commercial treaty with Ecuador before negotia-
38 E. S. CORWIN, supra note 17 at 254-58.
a9 S. Doc. No. 39,88th CONG., 2d SEss. (1964), p. 463:
"Actually, the negotiation of treaties had long since been taken over by the
President; the Senate's role in relation to treaties is today essentially legislative in
character. 'He alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot in-
trude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it,' declared Justice Sutherland for
the Court in 1936."
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tions rather than after. Polk, in 1846, asked the Senate's approval of sug-
gested terms of peace with Mexico, and similar requests were forwarded
by Buchanan and Lincoln in 1861, Johnson in 1868, Grant in 1872, and
1874, and Arthur in 1884. An indirect method of securing advance ap-
proval of the Senate was to nominate an envoy to negotiate a treaty
and attach an outline of proposed terms. Confirmation of the appoint-
ment then automatically approved the treaty project. This device was
used by Washington and Adams repeatedly and by Jefferson at least
once.40
THE VERSAILLES TREATY
It simply makes common sense that if the Senate has to consent to
treaties, then the President ought to consult with them in forming trea-
ties to avoid embarassments or a breakdown in foreign relations or in
the relationship between the executive and the legislature. The latter
could seriously weaken the nation. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 is a
case in point.41 President Wilson went to Europe at the end of World
War I to negotiate the peace treaty with Germany and the Allies. He
had entered into substantive negotiations and personally carried them
through to the end without ever seeking the advice and consent of the
Senate to do so. He was severely criticized for not abiding by the Con-
stitution's treaty power provision. For example, Senator Lodge, the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, requested the President
to submit a draft of the current treaty outline while the negotiations were
still in progress and said:
I am only asking something that has been done by almost all our Presi-
dents who have consulted the Senate about entering into negotiations,
about the character of negotiations, about awards, about pending negotia-
tions . . . The Senate was consulted prior to negotiations by George
Washington; it was consulted prior to negotiations by Abraham Lincoln.
And in the path George Washington and Abraham Lincoln walked
there is no man too great to tread.42
Senator Spencer said, "The President alone pursued his course, without
any conference with the country he represented and with special disre-
gard of the Senate, which, by the Constitution of the United States is
made his legal adviser, particularly in connection with treaties. 43  But
Wilson had his strong belief in the League of Nations plan which he had
built into the treaty and felt that the Senate had little choice but to ap-
prove it. In his book Constitutional Government in the United States
he had written:
The initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses with-
4 0 D. F. FLEMING, THE TREATY VETo OF THE AMERICAN SENATE 21-22 (Putnam).
41 W. S. HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 249-307 (Johns Hopkins Press).
42 Id.
43Id.
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out any restriction whatever is virtually the power to control them ab-
solutely. . . He need disclose no step of negotiation until it is com-
plete, and when in any critical matter it is completed the government
is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination, the Senate may feel
itself committed also.44
Indeed, when Wilson returned he toured the country to whip up sup-
port against the growing Senate opposition. But in the end his disre-
gard for the Senate's advice and consent role during negotiations led to
the Senate's rejection of the treaty.45 It is highly probable that this event,
which drove a wedge between the Senate and the Executive, was a prime
factor in the more serious erosions of the treaty power that followed that
period of time, such as the broader use of executive agreements, which
the Senate is now attempting to correct.4 6
SUTHERLAND AND THE U. S. v. CURTISS-WRIGHT CASE
This section discusses the circumstances and considerations involved
in the Supreme Court decision in U. S. v. Curtiss-Wrigh47 in which the
Court adopted Wilson's view of the treaty power. It can be shown herein
that Justice Sutherland's statement regarding the treaty power was dictum
and, furthermore, was without foundation.
Curtiss-Wright dealt with the legality of an embargo which was im-
posed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt pursuant to a joint resolution
of Congress in 1934, on arms shipments to the belligerents in the Chaco
War between Bolivia and Paraguay. The President was authorized to
proclaim the embargo if he determined that it would contribute to re-
storing peace. In delivering the majority opinion, Justice Sutherland
chose to discuss the treaty-making power even though this clause of the
Constitution was not at issue. He contended that:
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external af-
fairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal
affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly
limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.48
In support of this contention, Justice Sutherland quotes John Mar-
44 W. S. HOLT, supra note 41.
45 Anyone who thinks that the Senate acted irresponsibly should study the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee majority Report against the treaty. CONG. RECORD, Sept 10, 1919.
46See National Commitments Resolution, CONG. RECORD, S. 7122-54 (June 25, 1969).
See also S. REP. No. 91-129, supra note 18.
47 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
481d. at 319.
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shall: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external rela-
tions, and its sole representative with foreign nations. ' 149 It is true that
only the President can represent our nation in conducting foreign nego-
tiations. Hamilton in the Federalist Papers (No. 75), made it clear that
it is most efficient to have the President conduct foreign negotiations
and that the "Senate could not be expected to enjoy the same confidence
and respect of foreign powers in the same degree . . . with that of the
President." In No. 72 Hamilton stated that the "actual conduct of
foreign negotiations" is "most understood by the administration.""0
Sutherland infers from John Marshall that the President can enter into
substantive negotiations and even complete them through the agreement
stage without the Senate's advice and consent. However, this is un-
founded. Marshall made the statement in connection with an extradition
treaty with England, already in force. An Englishman who committed
a crime against English law on the high seas sought sanctuary in the U.S.
Upon Britain's request President Adams was seeking to return the crim-
inal to England. A resolution which alleged that the President was
usurping judicial powers in returning the criminal was proposed in
the House. Representative Marshall argued that the President was only
executing the law of the land, that is, the extradition treaty. Marshall
was not discussing the relation of the President to the Senate but his
relation to the courts.5'
The only other evidence offered by Sutherland was an 1816 Senate
Foreign Relations Committee report [hereinafter called the 1816 Commit-
tee Report]. As we have seen, Corwin attempted to use this report to
nullify Rufus King's explanation of the treaty power. It was shown above
that the opinion expressed in the committee report, which did not pur-
port to rest on constitutional grounds, was in effect repudiated by the
Senate two years later when it adopted Rufus King's argument on the
Constitution's treaty clause. However, since the 1816 Committee Report
is the only reference cited by Sutherland which discusses the role of the
Senate in relation to treaty negotiations, it is important to review in more
detail the facts surrounding this report. The Senate Executive Journals
for 1805 through 1828 (Vol. 2 and 3) are the sources for the facts used
in the following discussion.
On May 31, 1813, President Madison asked for advice and consent to
appoint John Q. Adams, and others, as ministers to negotiate a treaty of
peace to end the war of 1812 and a treaty of commerce with Great Britain.
The Senate approved most of the nominations but held up that of Albert
Gallatin until Madison removed him as Secretary of the Treasury. (On
49 U.S.v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 at 319 (1936).
5 0 THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (A. Hamilton).
5 1 ANNALS oF CONG. 6th CONG. 613.
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January 14, 1814 Madison nominated Henry Clay and others to join the
negotiating team and the Senate approved them also.) Thus, the Senate
had the opportunity to offer advice but simply chose not to do so, pre-
sumably because they had confidence in the appointed negotiators and
were not sure what advice to give. The Senate may also have felt that
debating the matter would have delayed the end of the war. For exam-
ple, on June 2, 1813 Rufus King moved to request from the President
papers relating to the arrangement of the peace conference, and the Sen-
ate rejected the motion. On February 15, 1815 Madison submitted the
treaty of peace for advice and consent. The treaty, known as the Treaty
of Ghent, was quickly approved. The treaty of commerce, which was to
come later, was still being negotiated.
On December 6, 1815 Madison submitted to the Senate "for their
consideration, and advice as to ratification," the treaty of commerce with
Britain. The treaty was ratified by the Senate, Rufus King voting yea.
But immediately after the vote King proposed that the Senate "recom-
mend to, and advise, the President to pursue further and friendly nego-
tiations" with Britain for the purpose of securing additional trade agree-
ments. The King proposals were referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations which submitted its report on February 16, 1816. This re-
port, which was the one cited by Justice Sutherland, took the view that
the proposals of King had been pursued in the negotiations and that the
need for any further negotiation ought to be left up to the President.
The matter was debated off and on for several weeks and then was drop-
ped on a motion by King, on April 26, 1816, to postpone consideration
indefinitely. The section of the 1816 Committee Report which was quoted
by Sutherland follows:
The President is the constitutional representative of the United
States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with
foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine
when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the
greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the
Constitution. The committee consider this responsibility the surest
pledge for the faithful discharge of his duty. They think the interference
of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations calculated to di-
minish that responsibility and thereby to impair the best security for the
national safety. The nature of transactions with foreign nations, more-
over, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently de-
pends on secrecy and dispatch.52
The remainder of the 1816 Committee Report, not quoted by Sutherland,
reads as follows:
A division of opinion between the members of the Senate in debate
on propositions to advise the Executive, or between the Senate and Ex-
52 S. Doc. No. 231, supra note 18.
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exutive, could not fail to give the nation with whom we might be dis-
posed to treat the most decided advantage. It may also be added that if
any benefits be derived from the division of the legislature into two
bodies, the more separate and distinct in practice the negotiating and
treaty ratifying power are kept, the more safe the national interest.53
Thus, Sutherland's claim rests on this 1816 Committee Report. But, a re-
view of the facts will prove that this report will not bear the weight he
puts on it.
It is apparent from the above that the Senate, with the exception of
Rufus King, was content in rendering advice after the negotiations were
completed, although the Senators advised and consented to the envoyships.
After all, the above mentioned peace treaty and commerce treaty were
successfully made in this manner and the successful Jay Treaty was also
made in this manner. This method is constitutional provided that both
the Senate and the President agree to employ it for each separate occasion.
But the 1816 Committee Report attempts to establish this procedure as
a matter of routine, which in effect is delegating to the President the
Senate's share of that portion of the treaty-making power involving ne-
gotiation, although still retaining for the Senate the power to approve
the appointment of those who negotiate. But the Senate does not have
the constitutional power to delegate its powers, nor can the President
assume delegated powers. It should also be noted that the Senate did
not formally endorse the 1816 Committee Report. But more important,
two years later during the debate on the Burrill resolution in 1818, Rufus
King convinced the Senate that it cannot under the Constitution delegate
any portion of the treaty-making power. (Recall that King was a
prominent member of the Constitution Convention. Senator Bibb, who
submitted the 1816 Committee Report, was not a delegate to that con-
vention.)M The 1818 King speech, which was discussed earlier in con-
nection with Senate Doc. No. 39, is presented here in its complete text:
Without adverting to the several branches of the executive power, for
the purpose of distinguishing the cases in which it is exclusively vested
in the President, from those -in which it is vested in him jointly with the
Senate, it will suffice on this occasion to observe that, in respect to
foreign affairs, the President has no exclusive binding power, except that
of receiving Ambassadors and other foreign Ministers, which, as it in-
volves the decision of the competence of the power which sends them,
may be an act of this character; to the validity of all other definitive
proceedings in the management of foreign affairs, the Constitutional ad-
vice and consent of the Senate are indispensable.
In these concerns the Senate are the Constitutional and the only
responsible counsellors of the President. And in this capacity the
Senate may, and ought to, look into and watch over every branch of the
r Id.
5 M. FAnmND, supra note 13.
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foreign affairs of the nation; they may, therefore, at any time call for
full and exact information respecting the foreign affairs, and express
their opinion and advice to the President respecting the same, when,
and under whatever other circumstances, they may think such advice
expedient.
There is a peculiar jealousy manifested in the Constitution concern-
ing the power which shall manage the foreign affairs, and make treaties
with foreign nations. Hence, the provision which requires the consent of
two-thirds of the Senators to confirm any compact with a foreign na-
tion that shall bind the United States; thus putting it in the power of
a minority of the Senators, or States to control the President and a major-
ity of the Senate: a check on the Executive power to be found in no
other case.
To make a treaty includes all the proceedings by which it is made and
the advice and consent of the Senate being necessary in the making of
treaties, must necessarily be so, touching the measures employed in
making the same. The Constitution does not say that treaties shall be
concluded, but that they shall be made, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate: none therefore can be made without such advice and
consent; and the objections against the agency of the Senate in making
treaties, or in advising the President to make the same, cannot be sus-
tained, but by giving to the Constitution an interpretation different
from its obvious and most salutary meaning.
To support the objection, this gloss must be given to the Constitu-
tion, 'that the President shall make treaties, and by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate ratify the same.' That this is, or could have
been intended to be the interpretation of the Constitution, one observa-
tion will disprove. If the President alone has power to make a treaty,
and the same be made pursuant to the powers and instructions given to
his Minister, its ratification follows as a matter of course, and to refuse
the same would be a violation of good faith; to call in the Senate to
deliberate, to advise, and to consent to an act which it would be binding
on them to approve and ratify, will it is presumed, be deemed too trivial
to satisfy the extraordinary provision of the Constitution, that has been
cited.5
After hearing King's speech the Senate voted to interfere in the
direction of foreign negotiations-that is, it passed the Burrill resolu-
tion-and thereby rejected the opinion of the 1816 Committee Report
relative to the treaty-making power. As for the commerce treaty with
Britain that precipitated the 1816 Committee Report, the Senate voted
to involve itself in the course of further negotiations on commerce with
Britain on January 26, 1819 and again on January 3, 1820. These facts,
and a correct understanding of John Marshall's "sole organ" speech,
leave the opinion of Sutherland regarding treaty negotiations completely
without foundation. Furthermore, Sutherland simply ignores the records
of the Constitution Convention, the Federalist Papers, the record of the
first years in the Senate Executive Journal, which records the executive
65 ANNALS OF CONG. 15th CoNG., 1st Swss. 106-07.
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proceedings apart from the legislative proceedings, and particularly the
Rufus King speech and its associated Senate endorsement.
In the face of all this evidence the question is raised: What caused
Sutherland to offer his dictum on the treaty-making power? An article
by Forrest R. Black in 1931, The United States Senate and the Treaty
Power,56 is most revealing in this respect. Black reported that at that
time there were "two widely divergent schools of thought as to the re-
spective [constitutional] roles of the President and of the Senate" in mak-
ing treaties:
The Washingtonian [interpretation] views the role of the Senate as an
integral part of the treaty making function, which may be exercised at
any stage of a negotiation; the other [interpretation], the Wilsonian,
considers the function of the Senate merely to give sanction to a treaty
that is already drafted . . . [and] would make the word 'advice' mere
surplusage. 57
The Wilsonian view found its literary expression in Corwin's book,
The President's Control of Foreign Relations, 1917, which was written
to answer "the numerous interesting questions which have arisen since
Mr. Wilson went to Washington as to the powers of the President in the
diplomatic field." 58  Black presented a very informative and thorough
analysis of this issue and concluded that the "Washingtonian" inter-
pretation was correct but he indicated that the "Wilsonian" view was
more likely to prevail. In summing up the case for the Wilsonian ad-
vocates, Black states: "The gist of their case seems to be that the nature
of transactions with foreign nations requires caution and unity of design,
and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch . . . that a
division of opinion between the Senate and the President could not
fail to give the nation with whom we might be disposed to treat, the most
decided advantage."59  Now observe that the case for the Wilsonian ad-
vocates as reported by Black (italicized) was taken verbatim from the
previously mentioned 1816 Foreign Relations Committee report and
reappeared in the Curtiss-Wright opinion five years after Black's arti-
cle when Sutherland adopted the Wilsonian interpretation.60
5 6 F. IL BLAcK, THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND TREATY PowER, 4 ROCKY MT. L 11Ev.
1-19 (1931). Black's article discusses many other considerations and important historical
events affecting the treaty power and refers to other articles on the subject. His article should
be studied by all those pursuing this matter.
57 Id.
58 E. S. CoRwIN, THE PRESIENTS CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, preface.
59 F. R. BLAK, supra note 56 at 12 and 14.
60The Curtiss-Wright case had to do with the President executing a law of Congress
and not the negotiating of any treaty. So why did the Court settle one of the questions
Corwin tried to answer? The Constitution does not grant the Judiciary the power to settle
questions, only cases. It is ironic that in the very speech by John Marshall cited by Suther-
land in the Curtiss-Wright decision, Marshall said this about the Court settling questions:
"By the Constitution, the Judicial Power of the United States is extended to all cases in
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It is thus apparent that there was in the period of 1917-1936 an ag-
grandizement of the Executive in foreign affairs and that Sutherland in
Curtiss-Wright played a part.
However, if Sutherland wanted to contend that the President has the
power to negotiate without Senate advice, a power not explicitly dele-
gated by the Constitution, then the burden was on him to come up with
facts to justify that position. But the two minute fragments of historical
data relied on by Sutherland do not support him. The meager basis for
his treaty power opinion, however, can be explained. For there was a
larger issue that concerned Sutherland and this was his theory of im-
plied foreign affairs powers which was central to the trend toward more
executive powers in foreign affairs. This theory occupies most of Suth-
erland's attention in his Curtiss-Wright opinion with the treaty power
mentioned only briefly. (Moreover, if the negotiation of treaties was
Sutherland's main concern, he surely would not have omitted the last
paragraph of the 1816 Committee Report which said: ". . . the more
separate and distinct in practice the negotiating and treaty ratifying
power are kept, the more safe the national interest.") His theory is
based on the assumption that the federal government's "powers of exter-
nal sovereignty did not depend upon affirmative grants of the Constitu-
tion.""' This theory is presented in more detail in his book, Constitu-
tional Power and World Affairs.62  A review of this book in connection
with the treaty-making power is therefore essential because therein is Suth-
erland's real basis for his Curtiss-Wright opinion on the treaty power.
It would seem easy to disprove the view that "powers of external sov-
ereignty did not depend upon affirmative grants of the Constitution,"
since the tenth amendment of the Constitution evidently precludes them.
After all, the Court, in 1957, in Reid vs. Covert stated:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accor-
dance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution . . . the
United States Government . . . has no power except that granted by the
Constitution .... 6
law and equity, arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States but
the resolutions [under debate] declare that Judicial power to extend to all questions arising
under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States. The difference between the
Constitution and resolutions was material and apparent. A case in law or equity was a
term well understood, and of limited signification. It was a controversy between parties
which had taken a shape for judicial decision. If the Judicial power extended to every
question under the Constitution, it would involve almost every subject proper for Legislative
discussion and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United
States, it would involve almost every subject on which the Executive could act. The division
of power which the gentleman had stated, could exist no longer, and the other departments
would be swallowed by the Judiciary." Annals of Cong., 6th Cong., at 606.
01 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 at 319 (1936).
02Columbia University Press, 1919.
03354 U.S. 1 at 12 (1956).
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However, Sutherland, in his book, argued that if an external sovereignty
power was not expressly granted in the Constitution, but neither denied,
then this power (whatever it might be) was still granted to the national
government by the Constitution since neither the people nor the states
could have it in practicality. That is, he argues, the tenth amendment
does not apply to external sovereignty powers because the framers (sup-
posedly) intended that these powers were complete under the Constitu-
tion, whether or not they all are expressly stated in the Constitution's
phraseology:
"We must cease to measure the authority of the general government
only by what the Constitution affirmatively grants, and consider it also
in the light of what the Constitution permits from failure to deny.""
Since Sutherland deprives us the use of the tenth amendment in order to
reject his theory, we must review his basis.
Sutherland's book was written at the end of World War I. Because
of the new magnitude of horror which the war had wrought, he expressed
his strong conviction that the United States must build a military pre-
paredness, including compulsory service, and actively participate in in-
ternational politics and adopt:
Every possible safeguard which can be devised to prevent a repeti-
tion of the conditions under which Germany came perilously near
realizing her dream of European dictatorship . . . the master of Europe
[will be] ... the master of the world.65
Although Sutherland opposed the League of Nation's plan, he urged "ex-
tension of the principles and plans" of the Permanent (International)
Court of Arbitration established by the Hague Conference of 1899. He
stated,
It must be apparent to everyone that the field of national responsi-
bility will be immensely broadened as a result of the war, and there
will be presented questions not only relating to this phase of the matter
but questions no less important related to the power of the national
government under the Constitution to deal with them.66
The powers of the national government over external affairs, all
at once, therefore have assumed new and increased importance, in the
light of which, a re-examination of their nature and extent is not only
pertinent but may, sooner or later, become highly necessary; for it is
certain that hereafter, whether desired or desirable, we shall be obliged
to occupy a larger place in the affairs of the world, to participate to a far
greater degree in world policies and lend substantial and increased assist-
ance toward the solution of world problems.67
64 G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL PoWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 172 (Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1919).
651d. at 21.
06 Id. at 18.
671d. at 26.
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For this condition of affairs, there must result, as will be shown
hereafter at length [in his book], a rule of constitutional construction
radically more liberal than that which obtains in the case of domestic
powers .. .any rule of construction which would result -in curtailing
or preventing action on the part of the national government in the en-
larged field of world responsibility which we are entering, might prove
highly injurious or embarrassing.68
[Therefore], in this new and extended relationship, we shall probably
be obliged to extend the scope and application of the familiar mean-
ings of the Constitution, and it may be to find-though not to make
-new meanings. 69
In his search for "new meanings" he states, after quoting the "precise
language of the Constitution" regarding the treaty-making power:
It will be observed that the advice and consent of the Senate quali-
fies the power of the President to make, not to negotiate, treaties. When
a treaty is contemplated, therefore, the President may, and more often does,
enter upon negotiations with foreign governments, through diplomatic
channels, and carries them to the point of reaching an understanding as to
the terms and phraseology of the treaty, before the advice and consent of
the Senate is sought at all-subject of course, finally, to Senatorial action.Y0
This "new meaning" is of course incorrect as the wealth of evidence
presented in this article demonstrates. Furthermore, Sutherland attempts
no proof in his book of this assertion, except to say that the Constitu-
tion does not explicitly deny it. (Presumably, he relied on Corwin to
attempt a proof since he undoubtedly had a high regard for him-e.g.,
he called Professor Corwin's book, National Supremacy, "brilliantly con-
vincing.") He "found" this separate "negotiation power" so that the
President could move freely in international affairs by avoiding any
possible Senate interference. For he states:
The time is fast approaching, if it be not already here, when we
must be able to assert and maintain for that [national]government the
unimpaired powers of complete external sovereignty. We must not--
we cannot--enter upon this field of amplified [international] activity
with half-developed limbs. The complete powers of the governments of
other nations must be matched by the complete power of our own
government. Upon this enlarged stage of international negotiation and
co-operation we cannot afford to play the part of a political cripple.
Our government must come to its new tasks not only with full, but
with unquestioned powers. To be obliged to confess, when called
upon to deal with some novel but vital matter, that the government
lacked sufficient authority, because of the absence of affirmative lan-
guage in the Constitution, would be most humiliating and regrettable
.. .any theory of constitutional construction which leads to such a re-
sult will not bear analysis and must be rejected.71
68Id. at 21.
O Id. at 27.
70 Id. at 122.
71id. at 171.
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Sutherland argued that the President has this implied power to nego-
tiate without Senate advice because the Constitution does not deny it.
He argues that nowhere in the record of the Federal Constitutional
Convention is it stated that our external sovereignty powers are incom-
plete. Hence, he states, because they are complete and because there is
the power "to negotiate," separate (supposedly) from the power "to
make" treaties, it resides with the Branch most suited-the Executive.
Therefore, he argues that the separate power "to negotiate" is granted
implicitly in the Constitution and, consequently, the tenth amendment,
"the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . .
are reserved . . . to the people," does not apply in this case. He states
that we are
"dealing with a class of powers, sufficiently numerous to be diffi-
cult of exhaustive enumeration, but which, whether enumerated or not,
might at any time, require exercise, and perhaps very prompt exercise." 7' 2
However, the above theory and arguments by Sutherland, which were used
to circumvent the tenth amendment, come crashing down to utter useless-
ness when confronted with the authority of the Federalist Papers:
No. 14 (Madison), In the first place it is to be remembered that the
general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making
and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumer-
ated objects [i.e., listed one by one in the Constitution].
No. 45 (Madison), The Powers delegated by the proposed Constitu-
tion are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce.
And so we are not dealing with a class of external sovereignty powers
that are too numerous to completely enumerate but rather these powers
are "few and defined" and include only those "certain enumerated ob-
721d. at 36. During the struggle for ratification of the Constitution, there was great
concern that the federal powers may not have been limited to those enumerated. James Wil-
son, who was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention from Pennsylvania, said to a
"Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia" that "in delegating federal powers, . . . the congres-
sional authority is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant, ex-
pressed in the instrument of union.... Hence ... everything which is not given, is reserved."
(Pamphlets on the Constitution, Paul L. Ford, p. 156.) The people insisted, however, that
Wilson's assurance be written into the Constitution. Madison led the effort to amend the
Constitution accordingly and the 10th amendment was included in with the Bill of Rights.
(The Birth of the Bill of Rights, Robert A. Rutland, pp. 126-218). However, there persists
the view that the 10th amendment is not meaningful with respect to implied particular powers.
See The Federalist Era by John C. Miller, p. 24. This view can be rejected with the authority
of the Federalist Papers, No. 44. Here Madison makes it very dear that the term enumerated
powers applies to those general powers expressly written into the Constitution and not to the
innumerable particular powers that would be needed to exercise the former. The latter were
to be provided for only by passing laws under the necessary and proper clause. This explains
why the phrase "expressly delegated" does not appear in the 10th amendment whereas it ap-
peared in the Articles of Confederation, Article I.
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jects." Thus, the whole of Sutherland's opinion regarding the treaty-
making power is not based on fact. It is dictum, without a factual
basis, and, hence, is without authority.
Evidently, Sutherland was willing to chance his theory rather than
attempt to confirm it, for he stated:
I do not remember to have seen it stated, but obviously it must be
this: that the exigencies of government administration, because of their
great variety and constant augmentation cannot be foreseen and conse-
quently cannot be enumerated; and it is better to risk an occasional
abuse of power than it is to incur the inconvenience and dangers arising
from lack of effective power.73
As to risking occasional abuse of power, George Washington had this
to say:
If, in the opinion of the people, distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by
an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But
let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance,
may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which
free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly over-
balance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use
can at any time yield.74
Although Sutherland's call for military preparedness and an inter-
national Court of Arbitration may have been good, his flaw was that he
was willing to violate our Constitution so that the President could move
more freely in international politics, thereby jeopardizing representative
government here at home. We have already accumulated much experi-
ence under his theory of a separate, implied negotiating power and the re-
sults indicate little success in achieving "solutions to world problems."
For example, Wilson sought to negotiate without Senate advice and he
failed to make a practical League of Nations treaty as a consequence.
We have had two large wars since then (World War II and Korea)
and no satisfactory resolution of either of them was achieved through
negotiations conducted without Senate consultation. We are presently
involved in a longer, third war and, again, negotiation without Senate
consultation has gotten nowhere. We have had and are having a
frightening nuclear arms race and negotiation without Senate consul-
tation has achieved only small success in nuclear arms limitation. As an
indication of the extent which the Wilsonian view pervades the Execu-
tive Branch today, the President is reported to have said that the recently
passed Senate Resolution 211 on the Strategic Arms Limitations nego-
tiations was "irrelevant." 7[i
7aid. at 47.
7435 J. FITzPATucK, WtiTiNGs OF GEORGE WAsHI-,IGroN 229.
75 CONG. REcoRD, S.6100 (April 23, 1970).
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SENATE ADVICE As A BODY
The "advice of the Senate" required for treaty-making must take the
form of a Senate resolution. The opinions of selected members invited
to the White House cannot constitute Senate advice and neither can a
collection of public statements made by individual Senators. The Con-
stitution requires that "each Senator shall have one vote"70 which was
the equality of states compromise reached in the Federal Convention.
77
Madison, in the Federalist (No. 62) said that the states "ought to have
an equal share in the common councils." Also, Jay in the Federalist
(No. 64) said that "should any circumstance occur which requires the
advice and consent of the Senate, he may, at any time, convene them."
(emphasis added) Jay does not say and neither does the Constitution,
that the President may seek out certain members and solicit only their
advice, or that a committee of the Senate may provide the advice and
consent.
To prove the last point one need only cite, again, the record of the
Senate Executive Journal, Vols. I and II, and specifically the message to
the Senate from President Madison in which he declined to confer with
a Senate appointed committee on constitutional grounds:
The appointment of a committee of the Senate to confer immediately
with the Executive himself, appears to lose sight of the co-ordinate
relation between the Executive and the Senate, which the Constitu-
tion has established, and which ought, therefore, to be maintained.78
Indeed, on another occasion the Senate attempted to confer with Madison
through a committee and the President again declined. According to
the report:
"He regretted that the measure had been taken under circumstances
which deprived him of the aid or advice of the Senate." 79
Having shown that advice of the Senate requires resolution of the
Senate as a body, it should be said that only a simple majority vote is
required rather than the two-thirds vote required for final ratification
of a treaty. The clause, "provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur," evidently applies only to consenting to the treaty. It makes no
sense to identify "concur" with the advice; the framers would not have
thought it necessary to state in the Constitution that the Senate must
concur in its own advice. Rather, if the Senate concurs, it is with the
plan of another branch of the government. Inspection of the Senate
Executive Journal, Vol. 1, will bear this out.
76 US. CoNsT. article I, § 3.
77 M. FARRAND, supra note 13.
7 8 SE'ATB EXEC. JoumNAL Vol. 2 at 382.
79 ld. at 389.
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ORIGIN OF THE TREATY MAKING CLAUSE
Early drafts of the Constitution during the Federal Convention of
1787 gave the Senate sole treaty-making power. However, the framers
were unable to agree that the Senate should have the sole power. Near
the end of the convention, on August 31, a committee of eleven was ap-
pointed to which was referred this and other unfinished parts of the Con-
stitution ° On September 4, the committee proposed to the conven-
tion the clause: "the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate shall have power to make treaties." It is again noted that Rufus
King was a member of this Committee of Eleven. This gives more
weight to his 1818 Senate speech previously cited where he explicitly de-
fined the treaty power. Madison was a member of this committee, also.
Perhaps he drew upon his state's constitution for the phraseology of the
treaty-making clause. The Virginia State Constitution, in effect at the
time, stated, "he, [the Governor] shall, with the advice of a Council of
State, exercise the executive powers of government." (The term "Privy
Council" and "Council of State" were used interchangeably in the Vir-
ginia Constitution.) On September 7, Mr. Mason moved to install a
"privy council" or "council of state" to advise the President in forming
treaties, and leave to the Senate only the function of concurring in trea-
ties and appointments, since otherwise the Senate would be required to
be in constant session. Rufus King then argued that the inconveniences
of having the Senate act as a "Council of Advice" did not warrant crea-
tion of a "New corps which must increase the expense as well as influence
of the [federal) Government."'" Mr. Gouverneur Morris argued that with
a privy council the "President by persuading his council to concur in
wrong measures, would acquire their protection for them."8' 2
As for the concern over the Executive having to share secrets with
the Senate, associating the term "privy council" with the Senate in the
drafting of the Constitution explains why the Senate adopted a secrecy
rule whenever receiving messages and documents related to treaty-
making.8 3 Further illustration of the point that the Senate was expected
to share secrets is given by the fact that on September 7 the House of
Representatives were excluded from treaty-making after Mr. Sherman ar-
gued that the power of making treaties "could be safely trusted to the
Senate. He [Sherman) thought it could; and that the necessity of se-
crecy in the case of treaties forbade a reference of them to the whole
Legislature."8' According to F. R. Black the Wilsonian advocates ad-
80 2 M. FAmuND, THE R coRDs oF THE FEDmAL CONVENTION oF 1787.
Slid. at 539.
92 1d. at 542.
8 3 See generally, SENATE ExEc. JoURNAL Vols. 1, 2, and 3. See also, Senate Rules Mdanual.
8 4 M. FARPAND rupra note 81 at 538.
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vanced the argument that "real secrecy is impossible if the Senate is kept
advised of the facts during the negotiation of the treaty." To this
Black said:
"But even if the Senate as a body should receive its [secret] informa-
tion, it would be in executive session behind dosed doors, and the argu-
ment that secrecy would be jeopardized is but a polite way of questioning
the patriotism and the motives of the members of the United States Sen-
ate.' 85
PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF
Corwin has argued that due in part to the Commander in Chief role
(the President can arrange an armistice on his own authority), the President
is "the sole organ of diplomatic relations to negotiate the final peace.""s
Here it seems that Corwin singles out the negotiation of peace treaties
as the exclusive province of the Executive. To refute this view one need
only consult the records of the Federal Convention.87  After the treaty
clause in its present form was adopted, Madison moved to insert "except
treaties of peace" after the clause. After that motion passed, Madison
"moved to authorize a concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate to make
treaties of peace, without the concurrence of the President. The Presi-
dent he said would necessarily derive so much power and importance
from a state of war that he might be tempted, if authorized, to impede
a treaty of peace. Mr. Butler seconded the motion. Mr. Gorham thought
the precaution unnecessary as the means of carrying on the war would
not be in the hands of the President, but of the Legislature. Mr. Govr
Morris thought the power of the President in this case harmless; and
that no peace ought to be made without the concurrence of the Presi-
dent, who was the general Guardian of the National interests. Mr. But-
ler was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary security against ambitious
and corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the late perfidious policy of the
Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of Marlbro' to
prolong the war of which he had the management .... Mr. Williamson
thought that Treaties of peace should be guarded at least by requiring
the same concurrence as in other Treaties." The motion failed. The
"except treaties of peace" clause was then stricken.88 And so to nego-
tiate the peace is not the sole power of the President as Commander in
Chief. Rather, the situation is the same for peace treaties as for other
kinds of treaties.
8 5 F. R. BLAcx, supra note 59 at 13-14.
8 6 E. S. CoRwIN, supra note 17 at 315.
8 7 M. FARRtAND, sapra note 80 at 540.
881d. at 540-41.
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THE VIETNAM PEACE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
If the Vietnam peace treaty negotiations are of the nature as to re-
quire the "indirect method," then the President should nominate an en-
voy to the Paris Conference and obtain the Senate's advice and consent
to appoint the nominee for the purpose of framing a treaty with North
Vietnam. The Senate may want to require that the envoy carry with
him an outline of proposed terms. On the other hand, it may be pref-
erable that a draft of a treaty be worked out between the Senate and
the President which could serve as the basis for talks with North Vietnam
and the NLF. This draft would also require the consent of the Senate.
The President would then be free to negotiate a final draft with the
other side unless the emerging treaty took a form substantially outside
that which was consented to by the Senate. In the latter event, the Presi-
dent would be obligated to consult again with the Senate. Either way, a
sound constitutional procedure is available to the President since the Sen-
ate would have in each case the opportunity to give advice and, upon
agreement, its consent to whatever plan of action might be worked out.
It can hardly be justifiably argued that this procedure would be impracti-
cably slow in view of the singular lack of substantive progress after more
than 26 months of negotiations in Paris with no official Senate participa-
tion. On the contrary, bringing the active participation of the Senate into
these negotiations, as suggested in the above procedure, may result in
greater and more rapid progress because there would be a closer cor-
respondence between our negotiating policies and our national interests
and welfare. To further support this contention, there is the rather ob-
vious view expressed throughout the Federalist Papers (No. 62, 63, and
64 in particular) that the Senate is to be composed of the "most distin-
guished men of abilities, . . . who [along with the President) best under-
stand our national interests . . . considered in relation to foreign na-
tions," and who, because of their six-year terms, will provide "accurate
and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics, a steady and system-
atic adherence to the same views, and a nice uniform sensibility to national
character." Jay stated that the six-year Senate term provided "sufficient
time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to
form and introduce a system for the management of them." All of
these statements point to the notion that the advice of the Senate is, if not
indispensable, at least of great value in keeping our foreign policy con-
sistent with our true interests and in keeping it from unduly fluctuating
in order to avoid causing ill relations, or, in the words of the Federalist
Papers, "forfeiting the respect and confidence of other nations."
Because the President and the Senators have all sworn to support the
Constitution it seems only right to expect that both the President and
the Senate undertake a thorough review of the treaty clause in order
1970]
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to ensure that each is indeed supporting the Constitution. It must be re-
called that twelve of the sixty-six senators during Washington's admin.
instration were delegates to the Constitutional Convention (of approxi-
mately fifty delegates) and ten were delegates to the States' ratifying as-
semblies. (Recall that Washington was President of the Constitutional
Convention, Hamilton was Washington's Secretary of Treasury, and Jay,
the first Chief Justice, wrote the essays in the Federalist Papers relating
to foreign affairs). These men worked together closely to make the gov-
ernment function as it was intended by the Federal Convention and the
state assemblies which approved the Constitution. In view of this, the
way in which the government operated during the first years under the
Constitution should weigh very heavily in interpreting the Constitution.
And during these first years the treaty power was exercised in a spirit of
co-operation and consultation between the Executive and the Senate.
This co-operation was an important factor in getting the Nation off on a
successful and solid start."
It has been said that the Paris Peace Negotiations are preliminary,
a kind of sparring to see whether serious negotiations are possible, and
thus do not require the President to seek Senate counsel."' However,
there is only one phase of any negotiation which the President can con-
duct without Senate counsel and that phase was defined by Jay: "Those
matters which in negotiation usually require the most secrecy and the
most dispatch are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are
not otherwise important in a national view ...For these the President
will find no difficulty to provide.. ."91 (emphasis added) Now as soon
as the opposing parties in Paris agreed to the shape of the table and the
place and times to meet, the "preparatory measures" were accomplished.
From that time on, the discussions have surely been of "importance in
the national view." Senator Bacon in his article, The Treaty-Alaking
Power, said:
It is proper for the Senate to advise at all stages. We do not advise
men after they have made up their minds and after they have acted; we
advise men while they are considering, while they are deliberating and be-
fore they have determined and before they have acted.92
In closing, it should be said that the advice and consent of the Senate
are intended to help the President in a common enterprise; they are not
hostile limitations. Since in the final event, the President makes the peace
8 9 R. HAYDEN, supra note 23 at 3.
90 See Senate Report 91-834; 91st CONG., 2nd SEsS., May 1, 1970, "Termination of Mid-
dle East and Southeast Asia Resolution," p. 21, 29. On these pages the Department of State
in commenting on various proposed Senate resolutions stated that the current Vietnam peace
negotiations (as of December 4, 1969) were not "serious," "real," nor "meaningful."
9 1 THE FEDERALIsT No. 64 (J. Jay).
92 F. R. BLACK, supra note 57 at 2.
[Vol. 31
1970] TREATY MAKING POWER 519
treaty, he must try to realize that the Senate is his constitutional and only
responsible counsellor, that the Senate is jointly responsible for the treaty
and its early conclusion, and that the Senate exists to provide wise counsel.
The treaty power makes demands upon the good faith of the President,
since he must decide when it is appropriate to consult with the Senate, but
consult he must. Our Constitution is both the means and the end of our
foreign policy. Not to follow the Constitution would defeat its purpose.
